THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Although jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments in state tax cases may be found
to exist, the present Congressional policy against permitting undue interference with
both state and federal taxing agencies would dictate that the highly discretionary
power32 to grant declaratory relief should be exercised only under unusual circumstances. If such restraint is not practiced, another amendment to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act may be forthcoming.
Guardian and Ward-Insanity Proceedings-Power of Judge to Appoint Guardian
ad Litem in Hearing to Determine Competency of Prisoner -[New York].-Pursuant
to a statute an inmate of a woman's detention house was transferred to an asylum for
mental defectives on the authorization of the prison physician and two competent examiners.' At the expiration of the penal sentence, the superintendent of the asylum
applied in accordance with another statute to the local county court for authorization
to detain the inmate because she was still mentally defective.2 The latter statute provided that the county judge should select two qualified examiners, including at least
one psychologist, to determine the mental competency of the prisoner, and that he
should issue a detention order if satisfied that the prisoner is incompetent. In the present case the judge appointed a guardian ad litem for the prisoner and directed the
asylum to pay the guardian's fee. The appellate division upheld the order of the county judge.3 On appeal to the court of appeals, held, that the county judge had power
neither to appoint a guardian ad litem nor to direct payment of his fee. Order reversed.
Matter of Naylor.4
Had the present proceeding been one to pr6cure the original confinement of a person alleged to be mentally incompetent, the judge could have appointed a guardian ad
litem. Authority is expressly granted by statute in New Yorks and in most other states.
6
But it is not dear whether American courts possess this power apart from statute.
Under English common law the custody and control of the person and property of lunatics and idiots were in the Crown, which delegated the jurisdiction to the chancellor.7
32 Cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288, 294 (C.C.A. 3d
1939); Automotive Equipment Co. v. Trico Products Corp., ii F. Supp. 292, 295 (N.Y.
I935); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 99 et seq. (1934).
1N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1940) c. 43, §§ 438, 439.
2 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1929) c. 43, § 44o; N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, Supp.
1940) c. 43, § 45I.
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s N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, 1926) § 207.
6 Grinnell, A Suggested Rule for the Consideration of the Supreme Judicial and Probate
Courts in Regard to Guardians ad Litem, 23 Mass. L. Q., No. 3, at io, 13 (1938); Chase v.
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Chase, 216 Mass. 394, 397, 103 N.E. 857, 859 (i924). But for the opposite view see Madden,
Persons and Domestic Relations § 233 (i93i); Singer and Krohn, Insanity and the Law 223
(1924).

Wharton and Still6, Medical Jurisprudence 485 (5th ed. 1905); i Collinson, Lunacy 87
Singer and Krohn, Insanity and the Law 222 (1924). The statute of De Prerogativ&
Regis (1324) recognizes this jurisdiction, "The king shall have custody of the land of natural
fools, taking the profits of them without waste or destruction, and shall find for them their
necessaries .......
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Early texts attributed to the chancellor the power to appoint guardians ad litem to protect alleged idiots, but apparently this power was seldom if ever exercised in a proceeding to determine competency, inasmuch as it was in the Crown's interest to have persons adjudicated incompetent in order to secure their property. 9 After the American
Revolution the power passed to the people as represented by the state governments,
and early cases reveal that the courts of New York and other states appointed guardians ad litem to protect alleged incompetents, without statutory authorization.Io
The New York statute authorizing the court to appoint guardians ad litem seems to
extend to the detention actions in the present case. Section 207 of the Civil Practice
Act provides: "The .... court may appoint a guardian ad litem .... for an .... incompetent person, at any stage in any action or proceeding, when it appears to the
court necessary for the proper protection of the rights and interests of such .... person except where it is otherwise expressly provided by law." The majority of the court
in the present case, however, thought that the exception controlled because the detailed procedure of Section 44c of the Correction Law, under which the detention order
was sought, did not provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The minority
pointed out that Section 44o did not expressly deny the judge that power. Further,
Section 44o provided that "such judge if satisfied such prisoner is a mental defective
"....
should issue a detention order; the "if satisfied" was construed by the minority
to import a judicial hearing on the competency issue.
Regardless of the wording of the statute there may have been sound practical
reasons for denying the county judge power to appoint a guardian ad litem. Two qualified examiners and the prison physician had passed upon the inmate's sanity before she
8A distinction can be made throughout the history of the law between the readiness of
courts to appoint a guardian ad ltem where an incompetent's property rights are at stake and
where the incompetent's personal (civil) rights are in issue. The courts usually have been ready
to protect an incompetent's estate from the actions of third persons. At an early stage in the
common law even these rights were not protected. Thus Coke in Beverley's Case, 4 Co. Rep.
123b, I25b, 126a (16o3), states that it is commonly said to be a "great defect in the law, that
no tutor is assigned to them by law, who may protect them, and principally their inheritance."
Later, however, where a party to a civil suit was alleged to be incompetent, the court would,
upon evidence, assign to him a guardian ad litem for the immediate suit although he had not
been adjudicated an incompetent. i Collinson, Lunacy 355 (1812). In Wilson v. Grace, 14
Ves. Jr. *172 (i8o7), the court said that it was customary to appoint a guardian ad litem to
protect estates of persons allegedly incompetent. On the other hand, where the incompetent's
personal rights were concerned no guardian was appointed. In Earl Ferrers' Case, ig How. St.
Tr. 886 (176o), the earl, charged with murder, pleaded insanity (and he was undoubtedly insane). The court refused to allow him to be represented by his own counsel, but instead forced
him to conduct his own pleadings. Collinson states that in proceedings to determine incompetency an idiot was never allowed to appear by attorney because it was supposed that idiocy
could be detected by the normal person, and that lunatics were allowed to have their counsel
present to traverse the inquisition (a finding of lunacy by committee and jury) only with the
Chancellor's special permission. i Collinson, Lunacy x71-73 (1812).
9Poor people were seldom declared incompetent inasmuch as the motive for incompetency
proceedings was to secure a guardian who would prevent the incompetent's estate from being
dissipated to the hurt of the incompetent, his heirs, his next of kin, and his overlords. Indigent
insane went their way unnoticed by the law.
10See Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (i9o8).
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was transferred to the asylum;I presumably she had been under constant observation
and the superintendent of the asylum had certified her incompetent when applying for
the detention order. But these added medical examinations seem as remote from a
judicial determination of insanity (to which a citizen appears entitled before losing his
freedom) as is the physician's examination that is commonly made before civil insanity
proceedings are instituted. Neither the qualified examiners nor the superintendent observed the alleged incompetent outside the state institutions, and neither reached his
conclusion under the supervision of a judicial officer. Nevertheless the state might feel
that by her criminal act the alleged incompetent had already demonstrated that she
was a bad social risk.- There is at least an apparent difference between continuing
the confinement of one who has been in an asylum and causing the confinement of one
who has been at large in society.
There are strong reasons, on the other hand, for giving the court in the present situation power to appoint a guardian. The proceeding is of great consequence to the inmate, for should she be pronounced insane her entire legal status changes. She becomes a ward of the court and her civil rights are suspended both as to her person and
property. 3 She is incarcerated for an indeterminate period.4 Her only means to secure release is through habeas corpus proceedings in which she must rebut the presumption of continuing insanity.5 Hence, it seems unwise to compel the trial judge to
represent the interest of both the inmate and the state. That a lawyer is useful in mental competency proceedings is shown by the fact that until the recent amendments to
the New York Criminal Code, commissions to advise New York trial judges as to the
sanity of a criminal defendant pleading insanity had to contain a lawyer. 6 The lawyer
can observe whether (i) "experts" are qualified; (2) the judge follows the rules
of evidence; (3) the experts confine themselves to legal (rather than medical)
ITN.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, Supp. i94o) c. 43, §§ 438, 439.
12An incompetent of a dangerous sort may be arrested and detained on suspicion of being
mentally deranged without a judicial proceeding. See io A.L.R. 488 (1921); 45 A.L.R. 1464
(1926).
'3 Singer and Krohn, Insanity and the Law 223 (1924).
'4 Some New York criminal lawyers advise clients who are insane "to take their medicine and obtain a definite relatively brief sentence in prison rather than a wholly indeterminate
(probably life) incarceration in an asylum." Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law
439 (X925). The conditions of such an asylum are more disagreeable to the average convict
than is confinement with sane prisoners. In People ex rel. Cirrone v. Hoffmann, 255 App.
Div. 4o4, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 83 (i938), a prisoner who had been transferred from a prison to an
asylum on the ground that he was an incompetent alleged that confinement in the asylum was
cruel and unnatural punishment in that his associates were of low mentality. He was returned to the prison when it was shown that he was not subnormal.
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N.Y.L. 1936, c. 46o, at xi67. This act has been repealed and a new commission set up.
The advice of the Assistant Corporation Counsel of New York City to this new commission
as to cases in New York City is the only role of the lawyer under the new act. N.Y. Crim.
Code (McKinney, x939) § 659.
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definitions of incompetency;' 7 and (4) the testimony of the experts is palatable to the
judge.,'
Though a court may possess power to appoint a guardian, an alleged incompetent
has no right apart from statute to have a guardian furnished him in a proceeding to
determine competency. Such a proceeding is civil in nature so that constitutional guarantees of counsel for an accused are inapplicable.19 The common law accorded no protection here and even impoverished defendants in criminal trials were not granted
free counsel until the nineteenth century. Since New York has not modified the common law in this respect, an inmate for whom a detention order is sought could not even
under the minority opinion in the present case demand as of right the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
Whether the court in the present case had power to order the representative's fee
to be paid out of the funds of the asylum is a separate question. A court has no power
in the absence of statute to command payment for the reasonable value of the guardian's services. 2 0 Section 207 of the Civil Practice Act, which the minority construed to
authorize appointment of a guardian in the present case, provides that "the court may
fix the fees and compensation of such guardian ..... Such fees and compensation shall
be payable from the estate or fund, or from the interest of the ward therein ..... "
This wording does not appear to authorize fees to be paid from the funds of the institution. In fact the compensation clause indicates that the section was not intended to
apply to an action for a detention order. In an original action brought by a public
officer to confine a person alleged to be mentally incompetent, the New York statutes
do not expressly authorize the court to order a guardian's fee to be paid by the state or
a state agency. Such authority, however, may be found by a liberal interpretation of
provisions of the Mental Hygiene Act 2" and this authority could be held to extend to
the fee in the present case.
X7The attorney may be "helpful" in preventing departure from the statutory criteria in
favor of an inquiry based upon more enlightened psychiatric principles such as the "unity" of
the mind. Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 276 (1925). However archaic the
statutory tests may be, it seems important that the commissions apply them so that courts
will respect their determinations. Mitchell, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 21 A. B. A. J.

271, 273, 274 (i935).

ISThe reports prepared by the psychiatric experts under the Massachusetts Briggs Law
have been criticized on this ground. Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime, 32 Col.
L. Rev. 933, 962 (1932).
'9 Cf. Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (i9o8), which stated that
there was no right to jury in civil cases (such as insanity) except where granted by statute.
2o The history of the right of the indigent accused to counsel presents a comparable problem.
For decades, the defendant in a criminal trial in New York had the right to attorney and yet
the attorney was not paid for his services. People ex rel. Hadley v. Board of Supervisors of
Albany County, 28 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 22 (1864). Payment was finally authorized by the addition of § 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1892. Even today, attorneys selected
to represent indigent criminal defendants in most southern states are allowed no compensation.
2. N.Y. Cons. Laws (IcKinney, 1927) C. 27, § 77; cf. N.Y. Crim. Code (McKinney, 1939)

§ 662.

